Othering Obama: How Whiteness is Used to Undermine Authority by Owen, David
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saggi /Ensayos/Essais/Essays 
N. 3 – 03/2010     
112
 
 
 
Othering Obama:  How Whiteness is Used to 
Undermine Authority 
 
by David S. Owen 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency in 2008 was undoubtedly a 
truly historic moment.  The election of a self-identified black man to the highest 
political office in the nation was symbolic of a degree of progress the U.S. has made 
towards racial justice.  However, there has been considerable disagreement in public 
discourse about how substantive a change this Obama presidency reflects.  Some have 
claimed (and did so immediately after the election) that the Obama presidency signals 
the end of racial oppression in the U.S.  Others have argued that while the Obama 
presidency is significant, it does not indicate that the system of racial oppression has 
dissolved over night.  This debate was sharpened in the summer of 2009 by the public 
discourse concerning health care reform.  To many, that discourse often devolved 
from rational policy critique to racist attacks of Obama.  And, in fact, the topic of racism 
broke into explicit discourse during this period, culminating with former President 
Jimmy Carter accusing many of the president’s critics with racism.  Much of the debate 
around whether or not the critics of health care reform were behaving in a racist 
manner turned on the question of intent:  Did they, or did they not, intend to send a 
racist message?  I will argue in this paper that this question misses the point.  The 
system of racial oppression, which was not dissolved on election night in 2008, is 
maintained and reproduced by behavior that echoes and carries forward racist 
imagery, representations, and symbols of the past in the guise of structures of 
whiteness.  While there were clearly explicitly racist actions taken by the health care 
reform critics, much of the harm and effectiveness of the racially oppressive behavior 
is found in what ostensibly looks like non-racial behavior.  Such behavior appears to be 
non-racial because it presumes the norm of whiteness.  These debates provide a 
constructive case study for understanding how people of color can be marginalized 
and devalued - even when they have achieved very high accomplishments. 
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THE FRAME OF RACIAL OPPRESSION 
 
In many ways, Congressman Joe Wilson’s shouting of “You lie!” to Obama during 
his address to a joint session of Congress on health care reform in September 2009 is 
emblematic of the conservative response to the Obama presidency.  While many U.S. 
citizens have rightfully celebrated Obama’s victory as an historical moment in the 
uneven history of racial justice, there are those on the right who have actively resisted 
his presidency, as if they are in denial.  During the summer of 2009, the debate over 
health care reform - one of the central promises Obama campaigned on--took a new 
turn as legislators returned to their home districts and held so-called town hall 
meetings to discuss with their constituents the various proposals regarding health 
care.  Many of these meetings were belligerently dominated by members of 
conservative groups, who framed the issues and provided talking points to those on 
the right who attended the meetings.1  Although intended to appear to be a 
grassroots protest, this was a highly coordinated strategy funded by corporate 
interests.  These town hall meetings became increasingly raucous, with participants 
shouting down their legislators and often expressing vehement opposition to 
Obama’s health care reform proposals.  The culmination of this first wave of corporate 
backed protests was Joe Wilson’s yelling “You lie!” to the President during an address 
to congress. 
Such an action in another national or political context might seem mundane and 
ordinary, but in the U.S. this was a serious breach of accepted decorum.  Before this, 
the accepted means of expressing disapproval during a presidential address was to 
simply sit quietly, neither clapping, booing, or shouting remarks of any kind.  Indeed, 
Wilson was reprimanded by the House of Representatives a week later.   
The racial dimension of this political debate over health care reform was 
unmasked a week later when former President Jimmy Carter said that Wilson’s action 
was based on racism—an observation made by many non-mainstream commentators 
and blog authors before this, but by none who commanded such authority.  However 
one might evaluate Carter’s claim, his remarks had the significance of making race 
explicit in this debate.  The reaction, of course, was to immediately and vociferously 
assert innocence and to deny any racial or racist intent whatsoever.  Those on the right 
who were being charged with racism defended their behavior on the grounds that 
they were not motivated by racism and certainly did not intend their actions as racist 
actions.  Rather, they said, they were simply voicing their disapproval with the 
President’s policies.  Many on the left, however, were unconvinced and saw a clear 
pattern of racial animosity underlying the critiques of the President. 
                                                 
1 For example, a group called Conservatives for Patients’ Rights, which took credit for disrupting 
these town hall meetings. 
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The debate between, on the one hand, those who argued that the town hall 
disruptions and Wilson’s outburst are motivated by an underlying racist dismissal of 
Obama, and on the other hand, those who argued that they were not motivated by 
racism and were strictly policy based objections, raged for only a month or two, with 
neither side I think clearly winning the public perception.  In many ways this is a 
familiar debate about whether a racial remark or racially discriminatory action is really 
racist (Blum 2002). However, this debate about the realness of the racism in such cases 
is misguided because it places too much emphasis on the conscious or unconscious 
motivations of the agents. The assumption that is made when the discourse proceeds 
along this predictable path is that the social, cultural, political, and economic reality of 
racism is predicated upon the intentions of independent moral agents.  In other 
words, that the best account of the racial reality is grounded in an individualist analysis 
of the social order. Furthermore, this assumption is typically unstated and presumed 
to be obviously true.  However, as many have argued before, the proper analysis of 
racism is a systemic one, that is, one that explains racial harms in terms of systemic 
oppression. (Crenshaw et al. 1995)  This is especially true in the post-civil rights era in 
the U.S. (after 1965 or so), where overt expressions of racial hostility and animosity are 
publicly discouraged and generally deemed unacceptable (at least in public, or in 
racially mixed company). 
So how do we understand and evaluate the cases of the town hall protestors and 
Joe Wilson?  The central question is not whether the speech or behavior was 
motivated by racism, but instead is this: does the speech or behavior maintain and 
reproduce the system of racial oppression?  The reason for this is that the system of 
racial oppression itself causes a greater degree of harm than do individual acts of racial 
animosity.  While individual acts of racial prejudice and hatred are deeply harmful, 
they do not produce the systematic effects that result from oppression.  Marilyn Frye 
describes oppression as follows:   
 
The experience of oppressed people is that the living of one’s life is 
confined and shaped by forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional 
and hence avoidable, but are systematically related to each other in such a way as 
to catch one between and among them and restrict or penalize motion in any 
direction. (4)   
 
She goes on to analyze oppression through the metaphor of a birdcage.  
Examined individually, each wire of the cage does not appear to be a significant 
impediment to action, yet the thin wires work together in a systematic way to limit the 
movements of the bird.  Essentially, the harm of oppression is that it unjustly benefits 
one group and disadvantages another group.  Racial oppression functions via social 
structures that organize intersubjective interactions, cultural representations that 
shape our conceptual frameworks, economic structures that distribute opportunities 
and wealth, and political structures that determine access to power.  The structures, or 
patterns, that are the media of the system of racial oppression are constituted and 
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maintained in social practices and behaviors of individuals.  As Giddens has argued, 
structures should be understood historically, as always already undergoing a dynamic 
process of constitution (1984).  On this view, structures and social practices (patterned 
individual acts) are mutually constitutive.  The conceptual frameworks, assumptions, 
laws, policies, institutional rules, etc. that make up racialized social structures are 
constituted and maintained by social practices, and conversely, social practices are 
determined by the rules embedded in social structures.  Thus, social structures and 
social practices are mutually constitutive.  When analyzing race, this account of 
historically dynamic nature of the social system explains how structures of racial 
oppression persist over time.  Racial assumptions, conceptual frameworks, practices, 
and so on of the past have shaped the social and cultural milieu in which we live and 
act today.   
 
 
WHITENESS AND ANTI-OBAMA PROTESTS 
 
I have argued that to properly assess the racial impact of the anti-Obama 
protests of the summer of 2009 we must examine not their racial motivation or intent, 
but the degree to which they contribute to the reproduction of the system of racial 
oppression.  But how do such actions reproduce racial oppression?  I argue that in the 
post-civil rights era in the U.S. the system of racial oppression functions primarily 
through the norming and privileging of the interests, needs, and values of whites.   
This norming and privileging of the interests, needs, and values of whites is what I 
define as whiteness. (Owen 2007)   
The original meaning of whiteness had to do with picking out a particular racial 
identity, with the purpose of distinguishing one racialized group, whites, from 
another, blacks. (Allen 1994)  From its inception, whiteness has been marked as the 
more valued racial identity relative to any other racial identity.  Thus, it has always 
represented the dominant conception of what counts as important, worthy, and right.  
In the post-civil rights era, overt expressions of racial discrimination have receded from 
public view, and the general belief is that racial discrimination is no longer justifiable.2  
This receding from view of overt racially discriminatory behavior is often 
misinterpreted as a significant reduction in racial oppression.  A brief look at both 
anecdotal and empirical data, however, shows that despite a certain degree of formal 
progress being made, the constraining forces of racial oppression remain significant. 
(See, e.g., Feagin, et al., 1994, and Brown, et al., 2003)  A growing consensus has 
developed in recent decades that place whiteness at the center of the contemporary 
functioning of racial oppression.  Whiteness, not merely as an identity, but also as a set 
of normative, legal, and institutional rules for behavior and practice, and also as a set 
of cultural representations that privilege images and metaphors of whiteness.  The 
                                                 
2 See Kinder and Sanders 1996.  However, as Kinder and Sanders show, there is a substantial gap 
between what people profess to believe and their willingness to act on those beliefs. 
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upshot is that whiteness is that set of social, cultural, economic, political structures 
that situate the interests, needs, and values of whites in the privileged social location.  
Whiteness operates behind the backs of whites in such a way that most whites see 
neither its existence nor how it functions—it is largely invisible.  Yet whiteness 
systematically shapes all aspects of the social world, providing whites with 
unrecognized (to them) advantages and benefits, and persons of color with 
recognized (to them) disadvantages and burdens.   
How can this account of whiteness inform us about the summer 2009 protests 
against Obama?   As I have said, I think the case of Representative Joe Wilson shouting 
“You lie!” during a presidential address to Congress is exemplary of these protests, so I 
will focus on this one action as representative of a shared set of behaviors exhibited 
during that summer.  Wilson’s outburst was unprecedented in recent history.  
Etiquette and decorum dictates that the President is treated with the utmost respect 
during addresses to Congress.  Typically, the most expressive form of disapproval with 
what the President says during such addresses is to sit quietly.  But Wilson’s outburst 
violated these norms, and it was defended—both by him and others—as justified on 
the grounds that he was speaking the truth.  What is important here is not whether 
Wilson had truth on his side, but the degree to which his action “othered” Obama.   
In shouting during Obama’s address, Wilson enacted a form of disrespect that 
was not deracialized.  Wilson’s action symbolically situated Obama as outside of what 
normal decorum demanded; the message being that Obama does not deserve such 
respect.  To be sure, Wilson would have denied such an interpretation, and I doubt 
that he had this intention in mind.  Nonetheless, the racialized import of his action was 
to reproduce the historically embedded norm in the U.S. that blacks are not deserving 
of white respect.  It does not matter whether he or anyone else was aware of this 
meaning of his action—its appearance as quite normal for a white man to treat a black 
man with disrespect is what generates the power of whiteness in this case.  Whiteness 
functions as the underlying structure that guides and shapes social interaction.  When 
it is historically expected that blacks do not deserve the respect of whites, actions 
consistent with this are taken to be not only normal, but also as fully justified.   
Moreover, the functional power of Wilson’s action is also located in the 
apparently racially neutral mode of its expression.  There is nothing overt in Wilson’s 
exclamation that implies any racial intention whatsoever.  His exclamation appears to 
be patently color-blind.  Yet, its color-blindness is only superficial.  Wilson’s action was 
always already shaped by race because race cannot be removed from social 
interactions by a mere act of individual will.  Simply denying its overt expression fails 
to demonstrate that the expression has no racial import.  The racial import in this case 
is found in the reproduction of the norms of whiteness—and doing so in a way that 
appears to have nothing to do about race. 
One political group called “I Want Your Money” produced a TV advertisement 
responding to the charges made by President Carter and many others that the 
vehement objections to Obama’s policy proposals were racist.  In this ad, a variety of 
individuals appear on screen to declare “I guess I’m a racist,” and it is explained that if 
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opposing Obama’s health care proposal was racist, then many Americans are racist.  (I 
Guess I’m a Racist 2009)   Of course, this is intended as a satirical critique of the charges 
of racism leveled against Wilson and others, yet it is appallingly cavalier in the 
willingness (ironically) of the ad’s actors to accept the label of racist.  Being a racist is 
not like being tall, or like being redheaded.  It is a set of beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviors that profoundly harm others.  Only those who have been fully co-opted by 
whiteness can comfortably make such an ironic claim.  The subtext of the 
advertisement must be read as follows:  My statement that I am a racist is absurd (and 
hence clearly false) since I am beyond any doubt NOT a racist—just look at me!  Here 
we see whiteness operating once more to underwrite the presumed innocence of the 
people in the advertisement (most of whom are white, but a few of whom are black).  
The advertisement symbolically communicates the assertion that all of the people 
represented in the ad are “normal” and not marginal or harboring any racial 
resentment.  This very assertion, which is communicated subtextually, presupposes 
whiteness, for only if those making the assertion are secure in their central and 
dominant social location can they play ironically with the claim of being racist.  It is yet 
another way to dismiss as particular, interested, and thus not of serious concern, any 
claims that racism is operative in the social world. 
The othering of Obama through whiteness is also present in recent attacks on 
him as an academic. (Stripling 2010)  In this critique, Obama is belittled as being too 
academic and (hence) an inadequate leader and man of action.  Charles J. Ogletree 
argues that “the “professor” label [is] a thinly veiled attack on Obama’s race…[it is] 
dangerously close to labeling him “uppity”. (Stripling 2010)  The effect is to situate 
Obama as an Other, as someone who does not have legitimate claim to presidential 
authority.  It is another way of saying—here is someone who has usurped power, he 
doesn’t really have a right to that power because he is incompetent to exercise it.  This 
subtextual message echoes explicit debates that date back to the founding of the 
United States over the capacity for self-determination of African Americans.  It has long 
been argued by some that blacks simply do not possess the capacity to be effectively 
self-governing. (Graber 2006, 46-58)  The professor critique when aimed at Obama is 
yet another way of positioning him outside of the white center, which is implicitly 
assumed to be capable of self-governance.  There is an irony here, however, in the 
association of academic with someone unfit for political leadership in the fact that the 
vast majority of college faculty in the United States have historically been, and 
continue to be, white.  But this doesn’t undermine the association, for the charge of 
being academic is clearly intended to convey the incapacity to act in the “real” world.  
It is yet another instance of the invisibility of whiteness that the irony of the charge 
against Obama of being an academic is simply not recognized. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The reaction on the right to the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency 
has many facets, but the one that is most prominent and dangerous is the often subtle 
(and sometimes not so subtle) ways that the right’s public critique others Obama.  This 
othering occurs via the medium of a racialized discourse of whiteness, where that 
discourse itself often appears to be derecialized.  Obama is effectively othered by 
situating him in a non-racialized way outside of whiteness.  When decorum is violated 
and he is shouted down during a formal presidential address to Congress, the 
symbolic import of this action implies that he is not worthy of the respect due the 
president.  In other words, it suggests that Obama does not hold presidential authority 
legitimately.  This is made even more explicit in the radically misinformed “birther” 
movement, which insists that Obama is in fact not a citizen of the United States and 
thus not legally eligible to be president.  But “birthers” and other overtly racist attacks 
on Obama are easily marginalized as irrational.  The implicit locating of Obama on the 
margins (if not entirely outside of) whiteness by ostensibly non-racial actions, I argue, 
has a much more profound effect.  For the implicit presupposing of whiteness in this 
way reproduces that whiteness and the structures of racial oppression it constitutes.  
Whiteness functions almost always in the background, as an unseen instrument for the 
privileging of whites and the marginalization and exploitation of people of color.  
While many herald the election of Obama to the U.S. presidency to mark the start 
of a post-racial era, the othering of Obama with the presumptions of whiteness shows 
that we are not entering a post-racial era, but an era in which racial oppression 
functions in ever more subtle and invidious ways. 
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